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Abstract 
 
The paper assesses the stabilization effects of the EU import regime for fresh fruit and vegetables based 
on the entry price system. The analysis is carried out on the EU prices of tomatoes and lemons and those of 
imports from some of the main competing countries on the EU domestic markets: Morocco, Argentina and 
Turkey. It is based on the estimation of a threshold vector autoregressive econometric model that is shown 
capable of taking the workings of the import regime into account. The model shows that prices behave 
differently when import prices are above/below the trigger entry price. This paper allowed to highlight the 
cases for which the isolation effect of EPS seems reached and the resulting stabilization effects. 
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The Price Stabilisation Effects of the  
EU entry price scheme for fruits and vegetables 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The EU import regime for fresh fruit and vegetables (F&V) is rather complex changing 
according products, partner countries and seasonality. There are several reasons explaining such 
complexity arising from the circumstance that the EU is at the same time the largest importing 
country in the world and one of the most relevant producing country. Therefore the F&V import 
regime pursues different objectives that in some situations could also be conflicting. The protection 
and stabilisation of revenues of EU producer of F&V; the supply of large and differentiated 
provisions of F&V to EU consumers at reasonable price; the integration of the import regime within 
the international relationships that the EU is promoting, particularly with developing and 
neighbouring countries, are the most relevant aims that the import regime should help to attain.   
One of the most controversial feature of the import regime is certainly the entry price system 
(EPS) that was introduced in 1995 after the signing of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture, replacing the old reference price system. The EPS is applied only to a limited number 
of products that are the most relevant to EU producers, while imports of other F&V products are 
only subject to duties.  
The main objectives of the old reference price system introduced in the 1972 Common Market 
Organization of F&V, that are also pursued by the existing EPS, were to give a contribution both to 
the stabilization of EU domestic prices of F&V products and in the prevention of market crises that 
in the F&V sector are rather frequent. The stabilization effects of the EPS, in the sense of reducing 
price variability cutting the lower tail of price distribution, may arise from the avoidance of imports 
from a partner country whose import price or, more exactly, an index built on it, called Standard 
Import Value (SIV), is below the trigger entry price (TEP). The effect would be the consequence of 
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the fact that in days in which the SIV of a product imported from a country is lower than the TEP of 
that product by less than 8%, besides the tariff, imports from that country are also charged of a 
specific duty that is roughly equal to the difference between the TEP and the SIV. If the SIV is 
below 92% of the TEP, the specific duty applied besides the tariff is the maximum tariff equivalent 
(MTE). The amount of the MTE for the different products is generally so high that its charge would 
make imports unprofitable. However, since the system works on a consignment basis it is possible 
to avoid the payment of the specific tariff showing that the actual sale price of the consignment was 
such that a lower duty was to be paid (Swinbank and Ritson 1995; Agrosynergie, 2008). Moreover, 
importers may also avoid the payment of the specific duty waiting for custom clearance when the 
SIVs are higher that the TEP. 
Shortly after the introduction of the EPS, Swinbank and Ritson (1995) comparing the new 
import regime to the previous, were rather skeptical about its ability to increase significantly the EU 
F&V market openness. In recent years, there has been a growing number of papers and articles 
devoted to the analysis of the EPS. Some of them tried to analyse its effects on trade flows of F&V 
in comparison to the previous import regime. Cioffi and dell’Aquila (2004) highlighted that during 
the first years of implementation the EPS showed a selection effect on the growth of EU imports of 
F&V, preventing imports of low quality/price produce. However, a recent evaluation report on the 
EPS demonstrated that in recent years imports of F&V products covered by the import regime grew 
at a rate not differing from that shown by F&V not covered by the EPS (Agrosynergie, 2008). The 
econometric analysis by Emlinger et al. (2008) through a gravity model approach showed that the 
import regime had effects on the EU import flows of fruit and vegetables, although for some 
product other factors should also be taken into account. Goetz and Grethe (2009) by mean of a 
multivariate statistic analysis approach showed that the relevance of the EPS is not homogeneous 
among different products and origins, being wider for more perishable products and for 
neighbouring partner countries.   
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Since the effects of the EPS on EU import flows of F&V are not clear-cut, while the issue of the 
destiny of the EPS after the Doha round is open, it is worth to get deeper insight on the different 
effects it produces. Particularly, the question of understanding if the EPS contributes to EU 
domestic prices stabilisation, that is the main goal of the EPS, is achieved is still unresolved.  
Recent papers by Garcia Alvarez Coque et al. (2009, 2010) found that the removal of the EPS, 
as well as the reduction of the TEP and of the specific tariff while keeping alive the EPS, would 
have moderate impact on prices of EU domestic products. Although the stabilization issue is not 
directly addressed in these papers, such findings also imply that the EPS would be effective in price 
stabilization. These results were obtained simulating changes in the border measures with partial 
equilibrium models of four products, that acknowledge the full effectiveness of the EPS in 
sheltering the EU domestic markets.  
The problem addressed by this paper is twofold: on one hand we assess the effectiveness of the 
EPS, trying to evaluate how EU F&V domestic prices determination process changes when the 
SIVs fall below the TEP and if the EU market becomes isolated from the competition of partner 
countries products; on the other hand we measure the stabilization effects of the EPS. Of course the 
size of the stabilization effect of the EU domestic price of a product is linked either to the 
occurrence of the EU market isolation and to the size of imports with respect to the quantity of 
products traded in the EU internal market. The econometric approach we propose and the results 
that are derived by its application to the cases of study represent the main contributions to the 
current debate on the functioning of the EPS.     
The task is not easy because the peculiarities of the price discovery processes in the F&V 
markets. Since world prices cannot be observed registering price of transactions on foreign markets 
and adding transportation costs to obtain cif prices as it happened in the past for the other EU import 
regime, in implementing the EPS they are estimated calculating the SIVs starting from prices 
registered on the main EU markets 
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The lack of prices on world markets, while the only available information are EU domestic 
prices and SIVs, obliges to carry out the analysis on the effects of the EPS on EU prices trying to 
evaluate what happens to their determination process when the SIVs fall below the TEP. This 
implies that the analysis will be carried out only on products that show a greater share of SIVs 
below the TEP, referred to countries whose exports to the EU have a significant share of the market, 
contributing significantly to the EU price determination process. On the contrary, the assessment of 
the stabilisation effects of the EPS arising from the deterrence effects in the case of  products whose 
SIVs are rarely lower than the TEP it is not possible. 
Our empirical analysis hinges on the idea that if the EPS affects EU domestic prices of F&V, 
their daily data series cannot be described by a random walk. We carry out an econometric analysis 
based on a model that derives its autoregressive structure from the competitive storage model by 
Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996), modified to take into account imports from other countries and 
the EPS. Starting from this model, we estimate and test a nonlinear threshold model as proposed by 
Tong (1978, 1990) and generalized in the multivariate case in Tsay (1998). In our analysis the 
threshold is exogenous and is given by the 92% of the TEP that distinguishes two different regimes. 
By means of this nonlinear specification we will be able to identify price relationships of different 
markets and products and how they change in the two regimes, assessing if the EPS insulates the 
EU domestic market when SIVs are below the TEP.  
Since the estimation of threshold models requires an adequate number of cases for each regime, 
our analysis is confined to products and partner countries that undercut frequently the TEP. For this 
reason, the analysis is concerning with four cases regarding the imports of tomatoes from relevant 
partner countries as Morocco and Turkey and of lemons from Turkey and Argentina. It is worth to 
underline that in the study on the relevance of the EPS of Goetz and Grethe (2009) these four 
combinations of products and origins belong to classes of higher relevance of the EPS. Although the 
analysis is confined to a limited number of cases, we believe that this is fairly enough to get useful 
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insights on the effects of the EPS on EU domestic prices.  
In the next section we outline shortly the features of market and trade of the two products on 
which the study is focused that are more relevant to the following analyses. The econometric model 
is presented in section 3, while results are set out and discussed in section 4. Conclusions and 
indications for further research are developed in section 5. 
2. The main features of the import regime and seasonality of tomatoes 
and lemons 
 
Tomatoes and lemons are particularly suited to the analysis that we are going to develop also 
because of the large number of SIVs calculated and published by the EU Commission, since the 
EPS is applied all year long. In the case of tomato the two most relevant EU partner countries are 
Morocco and Turkey, while for lemons the main partner countries are Argentina and Turkey. Given 
this choice it must be deemed that the import regime applied to the tomatoes imported from Turkey 
and Morocco is modified by preferential trade agreements although with different rules.   
EU imports of agricultural products from Turkey benefit of a preferential regime within the 
Custom Union agreement. The preferential regime is defined by Council Decision 1/98 (1998) and 
for many fresh and processed fruit and vegetables tariff exemptions or reductions are bound by 
TRQs and import calendars. EU imports of tomatoes from Morocco benefit of a zero tariff quota 
also subject to a reduced preferential TEP while the specific duty is the MFN one. The tariff quota 
was initially agreed in 130,000 tons of tomatoes distributed in monthly quotas from November to 
March (Council Decision, 1994). In subsequent years the quota granted to tomato imports from 
Morocco was gradually increased and spread in monthly quotas from October to May under the 
reduced TEP (Table 1). 
 
< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
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Among EU members, Spain is the chief exporter of tomatoes, except in summer when the 
Netherlands takes over. Morocco is the main exporting country of tomatoes to the EU, with a share 
of about 80% on total exports. Import volumes of tomatoes from other partner countries are much 
smaller: Israel and Turkey have a share of about 7-8%. However, Turkey exports tomatoes mainly 
during summer months, while exports of Israel are made of different varieties of tomatoes. The 
competition between Spain and Morocco is very intense due to the great similarity of their 
production seasons, target markets, technologies and varieties (de Pablo Valenciano and Perez 
Mesa, 2004). The period with the highest competition span from October to March, when imports 
from Morocco have zero tariffs if SIVs are above the preferential TEP and the volume of imports 
does not exceed the monthly quotas.  
As far as lemons are concerned, Spain is the main EU producer with an average harvested 
production in the three years 2006-2008 of 681.400 tons according Eurostat data. Spain is also a net 
exporter of lemons to other EU countries. Globally, the EU is a net importer of lemons, around 
400.000 tons per year, with Argentina that is the main partner country supplying the 50-60% of total 
import while Turkey is the second partner country with a share of 20%. Imports of lemons from 
Argentina are distributed from May to October while those from Turkey span from September to 
April. 
 
3.  The econometric model 
 
Considering that very often the SIVs of a F&V products imported from partner countries are 
below their TEP only for a few days, to assess the effects played by the EPS on EU products prices 
it is necessary to use daily data.. Since prices and SIVs are the only data available on a daily base, 
we have to formulate a simplified market model in which the equilibrium affects only prices of 
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domestic and imported products.  
The dynamic structure of the econometric model we estimate may be seen as a reduced form of 
the competitive storage model proposed by Wright and Williams (1982) and Deaton and Laroque 
(1992, 1996). These models are based on the idea that consumers can buy both goods that have 
been stored from the previous periods as well as goods produced in the same period. The cost of 
inventories to risk neutral holders is given by the interest rate r paid on capital and by the shrinkage 
of stocks from one period to the next. Deaton and Laroque (1992, 1996) build and test a model 
using only product prices series whose dynamic is based on a unique  stationary rational expectation 
equilibrium, while the estimation procedures enables the identification of the parameters 
characterising the structural form of the model. According to the competitive storage model, prices 
follow an autoregressive process of order one, switching to a white noise process in stockout 
periods.    
The storage model could seem not appropriate to represent price determination processes in the 
case of F&V products, considering that they are generally highly perishable and it is only possible 
to store them for short periods whose length depends on the products characters. Moreover the 
storage of F&V bears costs as refrigeration and conditioning that add to the shrinkage cost. The 
justification of our referring at the competitive storage model is based on the fact that we have to 
analyse series of daily prices and therefore it seems plausible to assume that products can be 
transferred from one day to the other.  
To evaluate the effects of the EPS on EU domestic prices of F&V we must also introduce 
assumptions regarding the relationships of such prices with that of imported products. At this aim 
we assume that price of imported products in the EU F&V markets follow the model of 
determination in a large country. Moreover since we have different prices for domestic and 
imported products we also assume that the domestic and imported F&V products are imperfect 
substitute in the EU consumers demand. This would allow the presence of relationships between the 
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two prices and separate price determination models.  
The reduced form representation of the price determination model in the EU market is an AR(1) 
system of equations 1-2:  
1) Pt       = f (Pt-1 , SIVt-1 ) + ε1t 
 
2) SIVt = g (Pt-1 , SIVt-1) + ε2t 
 
where Pt and Pt-1 represent the daily prices of EU domestic products, respectively at time t and t-
1, SIVt and SIVt-1 are the daily Standard Import Values, respectively at time t and t-1, f and g are two 
different functional forms, ε1t and ε2t  are error terms assumed to be identically independently 
distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2.  
To assess the effect of the EPS on price determination of EU F&V markets we adopted a 
threshold autoregressive (TAR) model. TAR models belong to the general class of non-linear 
models. Introduced by Tong (1978) and later formalized by himself (Tong, 1990), they have been 
widely used, because of their interpretability in many economic analysis (see among others 
Kapetanios and Shin, 2006). These models allow to include non-linearity by separating the data in 
two or more linear regimes according to a “threshold variable”. In our analysis the two regimes are 
separated by the following exogenous and deterministic switching variable (It): 
   1  	
   0.92  0  	
    0.92    
where again TEP stands for trigger entry price. The variable It allows to separate the data in two 
sub-samples according to the relative position of SIVs with respect to the TEP1.  
Including the indicator It into the system of equations 1-2 results into a two-regimes threshold 
system specified by: 
3)               , 	
     1      , 	
  !	
        " , 	
      1    "  , 	
   # 
where εit represent the error terms assumed to be iid (0,σi2), where i=1, … , 4. 
                                                          
1
 Since in many cases since the variable It might be zero 1 or 2 days per week the adoption of time 
aggregated data (weekly or monthly) is not suitable.  
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In our analysis we are interested in testing if price series behave differently when the SIVs 
are above (“normal” regime) or below the 92% of the TEP, that is when the maximum specific duty 
is applied. Through the specification (3) we will be able to assess if the two regimes are different. 
The threshold model can be estimated if two conditions are satisfied: 1) a sufficient number of 
observations are attributed to each regime (Andrews, 1993; Seo, 2003); 2) the estimated coefficients 
of the model parameters differ in the two regimes.  
A parametric form of system (3) may be obtained assuming an additive specification. The 
following threshold vector auto-regressive of order  one (TVAR(1)) results: 
4 %  &         '(1  )11 &1   *11  	
&1  1& +   1    '(1  )11 &1   *11  	
&1  1& +	
&        '(2  )21 &1   *21  	
&1  2& +   1    '(2  )21 &1   *21  	
&1  2& + 
where the superscript index is referred to the regime (I or II) and the two subscript indexes 
are referred to the i-th equation (1 or 2) and to the lag order (one for specification 4).  
For cases in which residuals autocorrelation might be an issue, we consider a specification 
of higher order. The TVAR of n lags (n > 1) of equation (5) represents a general case:  
5
-.
/
.0  &         1(1  2 )13
4
31
&3   2 *134
31
 	
&1  1& 5   1    1(1  2 )134
31
&3   2 *134
31
 	
&1  1& 5
	
&        1(2  2 )234
31
&3   2 *234
31
 	
&1  2& 5   1    1(2  2 )234
31
&3   2 *234
31
 	
&1  2& 5

 
where the subscript j indicates the lag order.  The order of lags in the TVAR(n) is 
determined by the Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC).   
In our analysis TVAR models were estimated using the full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method which is asymptotically efficient among estimators of simultaneous 
equation model and, for well-specified model, is able to provide consistent estimates of parameters 
either with iid ~ N(0,1) error terms and with errors autocorrelation (Greene, 2004).  
For the sake of simplicity, we present the interpretation of results referring to the TVAR(1) 
specification of equation 4 since it is easily extendable to the TVAR(n) model. If the price 
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determination processes of EU F&V products depend on the imports from a partner country and 
EPS affects such processes, the functional forms of the first and the second regime would differ 
each other. However, since the threshold variable discriminates the regimes according to the 
relative position of SIVs with respect to the TEP, the different competitive behaviors at different 
price levels might contribute to change the parameters of price transmission. Under the assumptions 
in the system of equations 1-2, SIVs and EU domestic prices should influence each other in the first 
regime. If the influence of SIVs on EU domestic price is observed in the first regime (*6  > 0) and it 
is also maintained in the second regime (*66  > 0) we cannot conclude that the EPS does isolate the 
EU market since the relationship stands in both regimes. According to model (4), if the coefficients 
of SIVs *6  and *66  in the equations will be, respectively, higher than zero and zero we can say that 
the EPS is effective in avoiding cheap imports from a country, isolating the EU domestic market 
from low price imports. Finally, when the estimated coefficients do not show an evidence that the 
SIVs effect the EU domestic prices in both regime we cannot conclude on the effectiveness of the 
EPS.   
As far as tomato imported from Morocco is concerned, since the TRQ is binding, changes 
in the quota size agreed between EU and Morocco may have had effects on the market price 
determination process. In order to capture the effects of the quota expansion from 150.676 to 175.00 
tons in 2003 and of the introduction of a further conditional quota (45.000 tons) by 2006, we 
modified the specification (4) accordingly:  
4. 7 %  &         '(1  )11 &1   *11  	
&1  811 91  812 92  1& +   1    '(1  )11 &1   *11  	
&1  811 91  812 92  1& +	
&        '(2  )21 &1   *21  	
&1  821 91  822 92  2& +   1    '(2  )21 &1   *21  	
&1  821 91  822 92  2& + 
where 9and 9  are, respectively, dummy variavbles assuming value 1 for period from 
2003 to 2006 and from 2006 to the end of the series. The TRQ expansion, allowing increased 
imports from Morocco, should lower the SIVs level, while the effect on EU domestic prices could 
be negligible due to the small dimension of additional quota respect to the total marketed quantities. 
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Furthermore, if the EPS is effective in isolating the EU price the quota expansion might not 
influence the price and SIVs in the second regime.  
The relationships among EU domestic prices and SIVs of different products and partner 
countries are quantified and compared through the coefficient η that normalize the regime/product-
specific impact multipliers2.  
      
4. Empirical results  
 
The daily prices data used to carry out the analysis were extracted from the Agriview 
database of the European Commission, which includes daily prices of F&V collected on EU 
wholesale markets of different member countries. Data on daily SIVs, proxy of border prices of 
imports, are calculated by the EU Commission. All prices are reported in euro and expressed in 
current terms. Since price series collected on the different EU markets within the Agriview database 
have several missing data, the selection of markets on which to carry out the analysis has been 
forced by data availability. The criteria adopted in the selection was to pick the longest series with 
the smaller number of missing price data. Choosing the market using the criteria of data availability 
may have the limit that market integration relationships could hidden possible relationships between 
the SIVs and EU prices observed on other markets. Concerning the analysis, when price series we 
choose still have missing data, they were omitted to obtain a full and continuous time series. 
The effectiveness of EPS in stabilization of EU tomato prices has been analyzed through the 
cases of imports from Morocco and Turkey, which account, respectively, for 83% and 6% of the 
total fresh tomato imports from extra-EU countries. Since EU imports from Morocco are mainly 
spread from November to March, when the import monthly quotas are effective and wider, the 
                                                          
2
 The multipliers in finite lag dynamic models with stationary variables are represented by the regression coefficients (Greene, 
2004). In order to compare the multipliers, the variable η is computed by normalizing the multipliers of interest by the ratio of price and 
SIVs means (e.g. the normalized multiplier :;<=6><that capture the change in price due to change in SIVs in the first regime is the 
following: ?6/?	
6 = *6 =6><AAAAAA;<AAA  ). In AR(n) model the multiplier is given by the sum of coefficients. 
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econometric analysis is built on daily price data related to these months, using a time series starting 
on January 2000 and ending on February 2007. On the other hand, since imports from Turkey are 
distributed from April to October also in this case daily data are limited to these months. The EU 
domestic tomato price were collected on the Almeria (ES) wholesale market. Such market is of high 
relevance for a tomato producing area that is affected by the competition of products imported from 
Morocco. On the other hand, to analyze the relationships regarding the SIV of tomato imported 
from Turkey we used prices collected from the French market of Chateau Renard3. 
To analyze the effectiveness of the EPS in the case of lemon we considered the SIVs of 
imports from Argentina and Turkey while the EU domestic prices were collected on the Murcia 
(ES) wholesale market. This market is of high relevance for the Spanish lemon producing area. The 
SIVs of lemons imported from Turkey and Argentina show a high share of values belonging to the 
second regime (17%, 124 out of 729,and 35%, 213 out of 611, for Turkish and Argentinean imports 
respectively). Conversely, as far as tomato imports are concerned, 13% and 11% of SIVs of 
products imported respectively from Morocco and Turkey pertain to the second regime. 
Summarizing, the econometric analysis was applied to two case studies related to the 
tomato market (a) Almeria (ES) prices and Moroccan SIVs, (b) Chateau-Renard (FR) prices and 
Turkish SIVs, and two cases of the lemon market (c) Murcia (ES) prices and Turkish SIVs,  (d) 
Murcia (ES) prices and Argentinean SIVs. Time series of daily prices and SIVs refer to weekdays 
from Monday to Friday and contain data for the season in which transactions are registered: 
November-March (a); April-October (b); October–May (c); May-October (d). Prices from different 
years are combined to obtain a unique sample and cover the periods 2000-2007 (case a), 2000-2004 
(case b) and 1998-2006 (cases c and d).  
 
                                                          
3
 We also conducted a preliminary analysis by using Almeria prices an SIVs of tomato imported from 
Turkey but no relationships between these prices and the Turkey SIVs were found.   
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< TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
< GRAPH 1 ABOUT HERE > 
order to carry out the analyses some preliminary tests and transformations of time series 
were applied. Nelson and Plosser (1982) showed that a vast majority of economic series could be 
better characterized by a unit root process rather than by a deterministic trend. Furthermore, 
according to other authors (Fama, 1995), price series are likely to follow a random walk process, 
that is a non-stationary process in which the autocorrelation function is one everywhere. This 
constrains the number of applicable econometric techniques to the non-stationary ones. 
Alternatively, time series should be transformed into stationary time series. If the data are generated 
by a unit root process, subtracting a deterministic time trend is not sufficient to produce a stationary 
process, while a correct transformation could be into difference time series (Hamilton, 1994).  
The presence of unitary roots in price series is usually tested by the conventional tests 
proposed by Dickey and Fuller (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and by Philips and Perron (Philips and 
Perron, 1988). The two tests were derived for the null hypothesis of unit roots in linear time series. 
Taylor (2001) suggest to replace the unit root null hypothesis with a stationary null when time series 
are expected to have non-linear adjustments. We performed two different tests to assess the 
stationarity of time series: the DF-DLSu (Elliot et al., 1999), which assume under the null the 
presence of a local unit root, and the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, et. al., 1992), in which the null 
hypothesis is the stationarity of the time series. Overall the tests reject the hypothesis of unit roots 
and fail to reject the stationarity of time series at 10% (Table 3) suggesting that price do not need 
transformations.  
 
< TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
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4. 1 Results: tomato market 
 
Final specifications for tomato cases are parsimonious and include only coefficients 
significant at least at 5%. In all equations the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent 
variables (prices or SIVs) assume a larger absolute value in the second regime, which is an evidence 
of their tendency to return in the normal regime. In this case, the larger the absolute value of lagged 
dependent the closer the behavior of time series to a non-stationary process, hence the larger the 
tendency to switch to the normal regime.     
As far as the case of tomatoes imported from Morocco is concerned, the two regimes 
contain respectively 566 and 85 observations. According to estimates in Table 4, the two regimes 
are different4: in the first regime )6 , *6 , ) 6  and * 6 are greater than zero and statistically 
significant (at 1% level), while in the second regime only )66  and * 66  are statistically significant, 
meaning that the reciprocal influence of the EU domestic price and the SIVs is lost in the second 
regime. We can interpret the results as an evidence of the effectiveness of the EPS in isolating the 
EU market from SIVs when the latter are below the TEP. As regard the coefficients of quota 
dummies, only 8 6   8  6  in the second equation are statistically significant, and negative, as 
expected. Moreover, 8 6  , the coefficient that capture the effect of the expansion of quota from 
150.676 to 175.000 tons is (in absolute value) smaller than 8  6  which consider also the further 
expansion of 45.000 tons. In other terms, the dummy coefficients allow to show that, ceteris 
paribus, larger quotas lowered the SIVs level while effects on EU domestic prices were not 
significant. In the first regime, the effect of EU domestic price on SIVs (:;<=6><=0.141) largely 
exceeds, as expected, the effect of SIVs on price (:;<=6>< equals 0.069) while no multipliers can be 
                                                          
4
 We introduced dummies in the TVAR(1) model to take into account series gaps, from the end of a 
season to the beginning of the following season. In all cases the dummies are statistically not significant and 
results are not affected by dummies. Therefore we do not consider dummies in final econometric 
specifications. 
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computed in the second regime. The results enforce the idea that SIVs follow the EU domestic price 
but the linkage between them is lost in the second regime.  
As regard the Turkish tomatoes estimated coefficients support the idea that the EU domestic 
price influence the Turkish SIVs () 6 and ) 66  are statistically significant), but not vice-versa 
(*6 and *66 are not statistically different from zero)4. These results do not lead to conclude that EPS 
is ineffective since the SIVs do not influence the EU domestic price in both regime but, according 
to the interpretation we provided in previous paragraph, we cannot conclude that the EPS isolates 
the EU market.The multiplier of EU price on SIVs (:=6>; ) is lower in the first regime (0.198) than in 
the second (0.367) indicating that the EPS strengths the influence of EU domestic price on SIVs 
when they are below the threshold.   
 
< TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
 
4.2. Results: lemon market  
 
The cross-correlogramms of residuals of estimated TVAR(1) models of lemon markets 
(Table 5) show that the autocorrelation of residuals is an issue, probably because for a product more 
storable than tomato in daily data there is a longer memory of the price determination process5. 
Therefore the next step in our analysis of the series of lemon market was the estimation of a 
threshold vector autoregressive (TVAR) models of higher order. We employed the Schwarz 
Information Criterion (SIC) for lag length selection6. Taking into account these results, we 
                                                          
5
 Contrary, the cross-correlogramms of residuals estimated for time series in case (a) and (b) indicate that 
a TVAR(1) specification might be appropriate. 
6
 The SIC values for case c and d reach their minimum (respectively 12.338 and 12.058 ) at lag 3 and 2. 
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considered a TVAR(3) for case (c) and a TVAR(2) for (d). The preferred final specifications7 are 
parsimonious and include only coefficients statistically significant at least at 5% level. The 
estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variable assume a larger absolute value in the second 
regime, as we observed for tomatoes, in all but one equation: the coefficients of Argentinean SIVs 
are larger in the first regime8.   
The TVAR model estimated to find the relationships between the price of lemons on the 
Murcia market and the SIVs of Turkey (case c) confirms previous results: the estimated coefficient 
*6 is statistically significant, while *66 , * 66  and *!66  are not statistically different from zero. 
Therefore the estimates indicate that EPS is effective in isolating the Spanish market from Turkish 
imports. The values of the two multipliers in the first regime, :=6><;<  and :;<=6><, are respectively 0.079 
and 0.032, leading to considerations similar to case a: in the normal regime the SIVs follow the EU 
domestic price but the linkage between series is lost in the second regime.  
The  results for case (d) show that the only relationship between series is the following: EU 
domestic price influence Argentinean SIVs in the first regime (*6  equals 0.101 being statistically 
significant while the correspondent multiplier is 0.091). Since  the SIVs do not influence EU prices 
either in both regimes in this case we cannot conclude on the effectiveness of the EPS.  
 
< TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 We introduced dummies in the TVAR(n) model to take into account series gaps, from the end of a 
season to the beginning of the following season. In all cases the dummies are statistically not significant and 
results are not affected by dummies. Therefore we do not consider dummies in final econometric 
specifications. 
8
 The result is not surprisingly since in case (d) the share of observations pertaining to the second regime is 
very large (35%).  
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4.3. The stabilization effect of the EPS  
 
The assessment of the stabilization effects of the EPS is pursued by evaluating changes of the 
first and second moments of the distributions of interpolated EU prices and SIVs from estimated 
models. Analytically we computed the mean and standard deviation of the samples under two 
scenarios: the first one simulates what is actually working with the EPS, while the second one is 
aimed at the simulation of a removal of the EPS under the assumption that the price determination 
model estimated in the first regime would remain unchanged even without the EPS. Therefore, 
under the two scenarios we have: 
1) the dynamics of time series is governed by the coefficients estimated for the first and 
second regimes; 
2) the dynamics of first regime is also true in the second regime. 
Computationally the simulation of scenario 1 is made by interpolating observed data using the 
estimated coefficients of first regime when the observed SIVs are higher than the threshold and the 
coefficients of second regime when the SIVs are below the threshold. The simulation of the second 
scenario is always made using coefficients estimated in the first regime.  
We expect EU prices and SIVs to be lower in mean and larger in standard deviation if no 
adjustments in price transmission are assumed (e.g. when coefficients of the first regime are 
adopted to interpolate data either in the first and in the second regime). The results of simulation are 
expressed as percentage change9 (∆%) of means and standard deviations computed under the 
second scenario with respect to those calculated in the first scenario (Table 6), for the whole sample 
period of each model and for each month we included in the sample. 
 
< TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE > 
                                                          
9
 The percentage change has been computed with respect to the mean calculate for scenario 1, that is ∆% =  BCDΩ6E  BCDΩ6 ,Ω66E/BCDΩ6 ,Ω66E where X = P or SIVs, Ω6  and Ω66 are the information sets containing, 
respectively, the estimated coefficients of the first and second regime.  
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Without the EPS the EU domestic prices and SIVs would be lower on average in all but case (d) 
with the largest effects detected for cases (b) and (c). As regard price variability, we found that for 
the EU domestic prices the removal of the EPS would increase standard deviation in cases (a) and 
(c), respectively by 0.12% and 0.64%, The variability of the SIVs would slightly increase in case (a) 
(0.04%) and more substantially in case (c) (3.5%). As far cases (b) and (c) are concerned, the 
simulated removal of EPS show that the variability would decrease.  
Looking at the simulated effects of a removal of the EPS at the monthly level, we have decreases 
in EU domestic price in all months for cases (a) and (c) for which we detected a clear isolation 
effect played by the EPS. For cases (b) and (d) we observed no clear effects. Monthly changes in 
price variability are consistent with observed changes in price means. The removal of the EPS 
would decrease monthly SIVs increasing their variability in all months only in case (c), while in 
case (a) there are monthly changes rather small of different signs. In cases (b) and (d) the simulation 
did not give clear cut changes.   
 Summing up,  we found that the EPS contributes to increase the EU domestic prices means in 3 
out of 4 cases and to decrease the standard deviations, stabilizing EU prices in cases (a) and (c) for 
which we detected a clear isolation effect due to the EPS functioning.  
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper presents an econometric analysis of the effects of the EPS on the prices of EU F&V. 
It focuses on the cases of tomatoes and lemons, since for these two products the prices of imports 
from the main EU partner countries frequently fall below the 0,92 of TEP, the condition under 
which the maximum duty is enforced. The following hypotheses were tested: when the price of 
imports fall below the 0,92 of TEP is there any reaction in the prices of EU domestic produce? Is 
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the EPS effective in isolating the EU domestic market in such cases? What is the effect of the EPS 
in terms of price stabilization? To this aim we specified a threshold model using the TEP as an 
exogenous threshold. 
Since data used in the analysis are daily prices of domestic EU products sold on the main 
markets and the daily SIVs of imported products from the main partner countries, we specified a 
model whose autoregressive structure is derived from the competitive storage approach. Analysis of 
residuals from estimates showed that in the two cases of lemons the lag structure of the competitive 
storage model is not able to keep up with the dynamics of prices and SIVs asking for a different 
approach. The specification of TVAR models for lemons gave better results from an econometric 
point of view. Overall the performed econometric analysis highlights that the EPS affects the price 
determination processes of both tomatoes and lemons, in the sense that when SIVs are below the 
TEP the price determination process of EU products follows a pattern different from the one shown 
when SIVs are higher.  
In the cases of tomatoes and lemons imported, respectively, from Morocco and Turkey, while 
their SIVs affect the prices of EU domestic product when they are higher than their threshold this 
does not hold when SIVs are below this level. Econometric analysis thus showed that, at least in 
these two cases, the EPS isolates the EU domestic prices determination process through the 
neutralization of the effects that low import prices could exert. This relationship doesn’t hold in the 
case of Turkish tomato imports, as well as of lemons imported from Argentina, since they never 
affect EU domestic prices. On the contrary, the EU domestic prices affect the SIVs, trough a 
linkage that is lost in the II regime in the case of Turkish tomato SIVs while it still holds for 
Argentina lemons. These results may be due to the small import flows of tomatoes from Turkey 
compared to the EU domestic production and trade while  in the case of lemons from Argentina it 
may be due to a different seasonality between domestic supply and imports. However this does not 
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mean that the EPS is ineffective, indeed these results may be also due to the effect of a poor 
integration between the markets on which these products are sold. 
The analyses highlighted the effectiveness of the EPS in sheltering the EU domestic market of 
F&V from low priced imports only in two out of four cases. However the resulting stabilization 
effect, as well as the support effect on EU domestic prices, is rather small, particularly in the case of 
tomatoes imported from Morocco. On this case there are some evidences coming from other studies 
that could be compared with our results. Particularly, the recent study by Garcia Alvarez-Coque et 
al. (2010) carried out through partial equilibrium models for some F&V produces, that includes 
tomatoes but not lemons, in the case of tomatoes found that the removal of the EPS would have the 
effect of a large increase in imports from Morocco that in the period 2004-2006 would soar by a 
percentage between 27,1% under a “low” scenario and a “high” of 74,5%. The last figure would 
produce a decrease of EU internal market prices in a range of -4.2% in October and -0.6% in May. 
These results show an impact of the EPS on EU domestic prices means larger than the one we found 
in our analyses. On the other hand we found that the EPS has very limited impact on SIVs, while 
changes simulated by Garcia et al. (2010) on Moroccan prices are much wider. 
 Regardless of the difficulty in comparing results obtained with very different methodological 
approach, the divergence could be explained by mean of two point 
i) Our econometric model is estimated using price data that reflect a market in which the 
EPS is working while without it market agents would behave differently and therefore 
estimated parameters would also be different; 
ii) The price variations resulting from the simulation with the partial equilibrium model of 
a removal of the EPS are obtained under an hypothesis of “high” elasticity scenario to 
stress the effects of the different policy scenario, it is therefore possible, as the Authors 
say,  that such variations are overestimated and therefore with a lower scenario they 
could be closer to those we estimated.    
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Ending this analysis it is worth to ask what justifies to keep working the EPS if its main 
objective, the stabilization of EU domestic prices, is barely attained. The maintenance of a complex 
system as the one underlined by the EPS cannot be justified only on the ground that it improves 
market information since other instrument could reach the same results more efficiently. Probably 
the removal of the system could help to have more transparent rules to F&V trade without hurting 
very much the level and the stability of EU F&V producers incomes. 
However, it must be acknowledged that price variability of F&V, particularly low price spikes 
when market crises occur, is still a relevant issue that deserves an appropriate  set of policy tools. 
However, the EPS does not seem belonging to such set.   
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Appendix A 
 
This appendix contains the detail on the calculation of the time series means and standard 
deviations under the two scenarios of presence and removal of the EPS. 
 
Scenario 1 
B GDΩ6 , Ω66E    · I(6J  2 )K6JLMN M   2 *K6J
L
MN  	
O   1     · I(66J  2 )K66J
L
MN M   2 *K66J
L
MN  	
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B	
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 2 ) K6JLMN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M  2 * K6J
L
MN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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 2 ) K66J
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 M 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L
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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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 M 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  	
V 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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Scenario 2 
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where  G and 	
G  are, respectively, the interpolated EU prices and interpolated SIVs, \ 
represents the information set, and more precisely, Ω6  (6 , ]^, _^ and Ω66  (66 , ]^^, _^^, the 
bold greek letters indicate the set of equation-specific parameters (e.g. ]^  )`6  a  )`L6 ).  
For cases in which the EPS is effective we expect to observe the following: 
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 S66G XΩ6W   S66G XΩ6 , Ω66W   
   S	
66[ XΩ6W   S	
66[ XΩ6  , Ω66W   
  	&P. PQR. S66G XΩ6W b 	&P. PQR. S66G XΩ6 , Ω66W    
 	&P. PQR. S	
66[ XΩ6W b 	&P. PQR. S	
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Table 1 - Preferential EP and TRQ granted to Morocco in 2006/07 
and monthly imports   
  Tariff  
Entry 
price  MTE 
Pref. 
Tariff 
Pref. 
Entry 
price MTE TRQ  
Import 
06/07 
  (%) (€/t) (€/t)   (€/t) (€/t) (t) (t) 
October 14,4 626 298 0 461 298 10000 10198 
November 8,8 626 298 0 461 298 26000 28813 
December 8,8 626 298 0 461 298 30000 34780 
January 8,8 846 298 0 461 298 30000 42807 
February 8,8 846 298 0 461 298 30000 45513 
March 8,8 846 298 0 461 298 30000 41975 
April 8,8 1126 298 0 461 298 15000 36303 
May 14,4 726 298 0 461 298 4000 12671 
Jun-Sept 14,4 526 298 6859 
Conditional quota 2006/07  45000 
                  
Source: EU Commission Regulation 37/2004 and Eurostat. 
 
 
 
Table 2 - Descriptive statistics per regimes 
 Tomato 
 
I regime  II regime 
 Mean Median St. dev.  Mean Median St. dev. 
EU price (Almeria) 
82.18 76.56 27.07 
 
52.13 51.21 8.44 
SIVs (Morocco) 
70.77 64.1 25.98 
 
37.18 38.6 4.19 
EU price (Chateau-Renard) 94.83 83.85 38.98 
 84.57 80 33.31 
SIVs (Turkey) 92.58 86 28.35 
 66.34 60.3 24.42 
 Lemon 
 I regime  II regime 
EU price (Murcia) 56.74 55 13.04 
 49.24 48.72 10.01 
SIVs (Turkey) 61.39 60 10.01 
 42.36 43 6.31 
EU price (Murcia) 60.44 58.75 10.45  56.15 55 9.36 
SIVs (Argentina) 63.59 62 6.36  50.81 51.8 4.44 
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Graph 1. Prices and SIVs time series (Source: Agriview database) 
 
Case a: Almeria and Moroccan SIVs 
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Case b: Chateau Renard prices and Turkish SIVs 
 
Case c: Murcia prices and Turkish SIVs 
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Case d: Murcia prices and Argentinean SIVs 
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Table  3  - DF-DLSu and KPSS test statistics 
 
 Tomatoes  
 
Spain - Morocco  France - Turkey 
 
DF-DLSu DF-DLSu KPSS KPSS  DF-DLSu DF-DLSu KPSS KPSS 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Almeria 1.248 2.739 0.192 0.194      Chateau-Renard 2.854 3.299 0.058 0.048 
Morocco 0.437 1.621 0.458 0.062      Turkey 2.315 4.046 0.095 0.079 
 
 Lemons  
 Spain - Turkey  Spain - Argentina 
Murcia 1.789 4.640 0.377 0.136       Murcia 2.342 3.621     0.139 0.131 
Turkey 2.663 4.551 0.248 0.016       Argentina 0.729 2.339     1.056 0.108 
(1) Intercept. Test critical value (10%) =  4.48; (2) Intercept and trend. Test critical value (10%) = 6.89 
(3) Intercept. Test critical value (10%) =  0.347 ; (4) Intercept and trend. Test critical value (10%) = 0.119 
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Table 4 -  Model results for tomato markets  
 Almeria (ES) - Morocco 
 
Chateau-Renard (FR) - Turkey   
 I regime (SIV > Trig) I regime (SIV > Trig) 
 Almeria  Morocco     Chateau Renard  Turkey  
α 2.451** 
(1.152) 
 2.661 
(1.669) 
 9.581*** 
(3.427) 
 22.186 
(4.194) 
 
Pt-1
 
0.898*** 
(0.026) 
 0.121*** 
(0.027) 
 0.892*** 
(0.035) 
 0.203*** 
(0.038) 
 
SIVt-1 0.081*** 
(0.025) 
 0.831*** 
(0.025) 
   0.531*** 
(0.044) 
 
D1  
 
 -2.073*** 
(0.756) 
     
D2   -2.131** 
(0.921) 
     
 II regime (SIV <= Trig) II regime (SIV <= Trig) 
α 
    2.531 
(9.366) 
 5.611 
(8.286) 
 5.946*** 
(19.806) 
 2.062 
(14.823) 
 
Pt-1
 
0.966*** 
(0.177) 
   0.942*** 
(0.223) 
 0.418*** 
(0.133) 
 
SIVt-1   0.893*** 
(0.235) 
   0.636*** 
(0.191) 
 
D1
 
 
 
       
D2  
 
       
 
        
R2 0.93  0.90  0.80  0.61  
Significant: *** at 0.01 ; ** at 0.05 ; * at 0.1 
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Table 5 -  Model results for  lemon markets    
 Murcia (ES) - Turkey 
 
Murcia (ES) - Argentina  
 I regime (SIV > Trig) I regime (SIV > Trig) 
 Murcia  Turkey  Murcia  Argentina  
α 0.224 
(1.028) 
 3.736 
(2.679) 
 5.142*** 
(1.534) 
 11.560*** 
(3.366) 
 
Pt-1
 
     0.963*** 
 (0.013) 
 0.093*** 
(0.028) 
 0.913*** 
(0.020) 
 0.101*** 
(0.032) 
 
Pt-2  
 
       
Pt-3  
 
       
SIVt-1 0.027*** 
(0.012) 
 0.466*** 
(0.041) 
   0.386*** 
(0.048) 
 
SIVt-2   0.248*** 
(0.037) 
   0.316*** 
(0.033) 
 
SIVt-3     0.119*** 
    (0.033) 
     
 II regime (SIV <= Trig) II regime (SIV <= Trig) 
α 2.202 
(2.315) 
 4.801 
(4.626) 
 1.091 
(1.247) 
 33.128*** 
(3.717) 
 
Pt-1
 
0.969** 
(0.049) 
   0.984*** 
(0.026) 
   
Pt-2  
 
       
Pt-3  
 
       
SIVt-1   0.380*** 
(0.105) 
     
SIVt-2   0.365*** 
(0.070) 
   0.388*** 
(0.067) 
 
SIVt-3   0.230*** 
(0.064) 
     
 
        
R2 0.932  0.561  0.876  0.426  
Significant: *** at 0.01 ; ** at 0.05 ; * at 0.1 
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Table 6 -  Changes in means and standard deviations under the two scenarios 
Tomato markets (1) (2) ∆% (1-2) (3) (4) ∆% (3-4)     (1)  (2) ∆% (1-2) (1) (2) ∆% (1-2) 
EU price (Almeria) 78.32 78.22 -0.12% 26.48 26.52 0.12% SIVs (Morocco) 66.44 66.40 0.00% 25.46 25.47 0.04% 
 
             
Nov 72.74 72.49 -0.34% 21.44 21.57 0.60%  60.51 60.53 0.04% 24.06 24.03 -0.12% 
Dec. 81.86 81.77 -0.10% 16.85 16.96 0.65%  67.94 67.94 -0.00% 18.40 18.39 -0.05% 
Jan. 73.49 73.46 -0.03% 21.15 21.16 0.08%  64.34 64.26 -0.12% 19.87 19.97 0.53% 
Feb. 72.85 72.86 0.01% 22.35 22.34 0.07%  60.69 60.60 -0.15% 19.60 19.69 0.44% 
Mar. 92.21 92.20 -0.02% 37.25 37.27 0.05%  79.15 79.15 0.01% 34.87 34.87 -0.03% 
EU price (Chateau-Renard) 93.41 93.20 -0.23% 34.36 34.29 -0.17% SIVs (Turkey) 89.43 88.76 -0.76% 22.83 22.09 -3.23% 
 
      
 
      
Apr 123.07 122.75 -0.26% 32.61 32.70 0.28% 
 
113.57 111.36 -1.94% 21.33 21.60 1.30% 
May 88.30 88.30 0.01% 22.45 22.42 -0.15% 
 
91.46 91.42 -0.04% 13.97 13.57 -2.89% 
Jun 72.27 72.32 0.07% 18.33 18.27 -0.29% 
 
72.52 72.38 -0.19% 9.02 9.01 -0.05% 
Jul 57.75 58.27 0.90% 15.61 14.94 -4.30% 
 
60.13 62.13 3.33% 13.50 10.43 -22.69% 
Aug 63.94 63.94 -0.00% 14.39 14.39 -0.00% 
 
68.87 68.87 -0.00% 8.03 8.03 -0.00% 
Sep. 96.16 96.17 0.01% 45.54 45.35 -0.42% 
 
86.72 86.25 -0.54% 23.47 22.92 -2.36% 
Oct 93.48 93.43 -0.06% 23.05 22.96 -0.39% 
 
86.32 85.89 -0.49% 14.23 14.13 -0.69% 
EU price (Murcia) 55.44 55.28 -0.28% 12.46 12.54 0.64% SIVs (Turkey) 58.06 57.47 -1.02% 9.16 9.48 3.50% 
 
             
Oct 66.50 66.40 -0.15% 12.10 12.16 0.50%  64.83 64.31 -0.80% 9.57 9.77 2.10% 
Nov 59.11 59.04 -0.13% 9.03 9.09 0.62%  61.37 61.09 -0.45% 9.28 9.55 2.93% 
Dec. 53.07 53.01 -0.11% 6.50 6.47 -0.49%  58.50 58.27 -0.40% 7.33 7.40 0.97% 
Jan. 49.32 49.23 -0.18% 6.08 6.06 -0.34%  55.93 55.52 -0.75% 6.39 6.51 1.78% 
Feb. 48.16 48.06 -0.22% 9.06 9.07 0.08%  54.54 54.01 -0.96% 4.71 4.78 1.47% 
Mar. 49.74 49.19 -1.10% 14.37 14.54 1.16%  51.13 49.50 -3.20% 8.77 9.09 3.65% 
Apr 61.49 61.25 -0.38% 18.50 18.66 0.89%  55.29 54.37 -1.66% 8.92 9.22 3.45% 
EU price (Murcia) 58.97 58.99 0.04% 9.61 9.40 -2.24% SIVs (Argentina) 58.71 59.09 0.65% 5.68 5.59 -1.61% 
 
             
May 57.69 57.74 0.08% 12.64 12.48 -1.27%  59.57 59.72 0.25% 6.86 6.83 -0.55% 
Jun 55.41 55.49 0.13% 5.49 5.41 -1.47%  58.68 58.99 0.53% 5.38 5.51 2.44% 
Jul 55.26 55.33 0.12% 5.46 5.25 -3.95%  57.92 58.65 1.25% 4.92 4.67 -5.12% 
Aug 55.80 55.97 0.31% 7.90 7.67 -2.95%  59.41 59.51 0.16% 5.23 5.27 0.66% 
Sep. 59.17 59.20 0.06% 7.83 7.67 -2.01%  59.31 59.66 0.59% 5.62 5.46 -2.94% 
Oct 67.23 67.06 -0.24% 11.11 10.85 -2.34%  58.27 58.64 0.64% 6.38 6.28 -1.49% 
(1) = kC|Ω6 , Ω66m ; (2) = kC|Ω6m  ; (3) = 	&P. PQR. kC|Ω6 , Ω66m  ; (4) = 	&P. PQR. kC|Ω6m  
X = P or SIVs; n^ and n^^ are the information sets containing, respectively, the estimated coefficients of the first and second regime.  
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Data appendix  
Graph A.1. Box plot per regimes  
  
Case a: Almeria prices and Moroccan SIVs Case b: Chateau Renard prices and Turkish SIVs 
  
Case c: Murcia prices and Turkish SIVs Case d: Murcia prices and Argentinean SIVs 
The suffix “over” and “under” indicate, respectively, the first regime and the second regime. 
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Graph A.2. Prices and SIVs time series 
Case a: Almeria and Moroccan SIVs 
Case b: Chateau Renard prices and Turkish
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with TEP threshold and II regime (SIV ≤ 
 SIVs 
2002 2003 2004
Years
2002
Years
September,2010 
0.91*TEP)  
 
 
2005 2006
2003
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Case c: Murcia prices and Turkish SIVs
Case d: Murcia prices and Argentinean SIVs
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Table A.1  Cross-correlogramms   
 Case a  
Almeria prices and Moroccan SIVs  
Case b  
Chateau Renard prices and Turkish SIVs 
 
 Pt   SIVt  Pt  SIVt 
Pt-1
 
0.111 0.061  0.160 0.092 
Pt-2 0.138 0.027  0.011 -0.120 
Pt-3 0.035 0.061  -0.004 -0.063 
Pt-4 0.018 0.048  -0.087 0.059 
Pt-5 0.045 -0.048  -0.001 0.065 
SIVt-1 0.068 0.041  0.070 -0.054 
SIVt-2 0.048 0.035  -0.022 0.001 
SIVt-3 0.058 0.042  0.102 0.191 
SIVt-4 0.057 0.039  0.044 0.130 
SIVt-5 0.015 -0.077  -0.062 -0.007 
2 st.dev. 0.0784  0.1099 
   
 Case c 
 Murcia prices and Turkish SIVs 
Case d 
Murcia prices and Argentinean SIVs 
Pt-1
 
-0.005 -0.016 0.016 0.052 
Pt-2 0.047 0.067 0.017 0.037 
Pt-3 0.040 -0.055 0.045 0.017 
Pt-4 -0.003 0.023 0.020 -0.012 
Pt-5 -0.053 -0.037 -0.027 -0.075 
SIVt-1 0.066 -0.205 0.028 -0.177 
SIVt-2 -0.069 0.162 -0.006              0.183 
SIVt-3 0.028 0.075 -0.006 0.112 
SIVt-4 -0.043 0.140 0.015 0.202 
SIVt-5 -0.101 0.022 -0.056 0.088 
2 st.dev. 0.0741 0.0809 
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Table A.2   TVAR(1) models with and without time dummies  
 Almeria (ES) - Morocco 
 
Chateau-Renard (FR) - Turkey  
 Almeria  Almeria  Chateau Renard  Chateau Renard  
α
I
 2.441** 
(1.147) 
 2.183** 
(1.247) 
 8.325* 
(4.176) 
 8.787* 
(4.158) 
 
Pt-1
I
 
0.899*** 
(0.026) 
 0.902*** 
(0.026) 
    0.876*** 
(0.048) 
 0.875*** 
(0.049) 
 
SIVt-1
I
 
0.081*** 
(0.025) 
 0.081*** 
(0.025) 
 0.029 
(0.065) 
 0.028 
(0.065) 
 
α
II
 
5.654 
(21.254) 
 5.448 
(21.754) 
 6.182 
  (19.938) 
        6.262 
       (19.857) 
 
Pt-1
II
 
0.956*** 
(0.235) 
 0.956*** 
(0.234) 
    0.945*** 
(0.293) 
       0.942*** 
  (0.295) 
 
SIVt-1
II
 
-0.070 
(0.521) 
 -0.062 
(0.525) 
 -0.007 
(0.343) 
 -0.003 
  (0.344) 
 
 Morocco  Morocco Turkey Turkey  
α
I
 1.410 
(1.561) 
 1.139 
(1.584) 
       21.672*** 
      (4.336) 
  22.215*** 
(4.324) 
 
Pt-1
I
 
0.099*** 
(0.027) 
 0.103*** 
(0.027) 
     0.197*** 
      (0.043) 
    0.201*** 
(0.044) 
 
SIVt-1
I
 
0.860*** 
(0.023) 
 0.860*** 
(0.023) 
     0.543*** 
      (0.057) 
    0.536*** 
(0.056) 
 
α
II
 
8.320 
(10.040) 
 7.275 
(10.185) 
      2.156 
    (14.874) 
    2.135 
    (14.801) 
 
Pt-1
II
 
-0.021 
(0.198) 
 -0.017 
(0.201) 
     0.419** 
(0.143) 
    0.422** 
(0.142) 
 
SIVt-1
II
 
0.851* 
(0.428) 
 0.875* 
(0.436) 
     0.633** 
(0.206) 
    0.631** 
(0.204) 
 
 
  
     Dummies     
D101
 
  
1.740 
(3103.3) 
  -6.131 
(1578.6) 
 
D102   -4.758 
(9455.5) 
  -22.182 
(1538.4) 
 
D103      -15.711 
(4270.4) 
     -0.574 
(1509.5) 
 
D104   0.505 
(3171.7) 
  -1.533 
(1505.7) 
 
D105   -0.573 
(3032.5) 
    
D106   -3.046 
(3069.2) 
    
D107   1.202 
(3143.2) 
    
The apexes I and II indicate, respectively, the first and second regime. 
In parenthesis are reported standard errors.  
Significant: *** at 0.001 ; ** at 0.01 ; * at 0.05 
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Table A.3   TVAR(n) models with and without time dummies   
 Murcia (ES) - Turkey 
 
Murcia (ES) - Argentina  
 Murcia  Murcia  Murcia  Argentina  
α
I
 0.894 
(1.139) 
 1.112 
(1.145) 
 4.661* 
(2.442) 
 5.830* 
(2.445) 
 
Pt-1
I
 
 0.944*** 
(0.030) 
  0.941*** 
(0.029) 
  0.936*** 
(0.117) 
  0.935*** 
(0.119) 
 
Pt-2
I
 
0.057 
(0.113) 
 0.122 
(0.072) 
 -0.023 
(0.113) 
 -0.024 
(0.115) 
 
Pt-3
I
 -0.033 
(0.101) 
 -0.096 
(0.062) 
     
SIVt-1
I
 
0.059*** 
(0.013) 
 0.076*** 
(0.013) 
 0.030 
(0.044) 
 0.016 
(0.044) 
 
SIVt-2
I
 
-0.045*** 
(0.012) 
 -0.060*** 
(0.011) 
 -0.023 
(0.045) 
 -0.025 
(0.045) 
 
SIVt-3
I
 
0.003 
(0.015) 
 0.001 
(0.015) 
     
α
II
 
2.569 
(3.998) 
 2.240 
(4.631) 
 -1.291 
(6.779) 
-1.426 
(6.787) 
 
Pt-1
II
 
 1.083*** 
(0.142) 
  1.116*** 
(0.161) 
  0.987*** 
(0.294) 
 0.959*** 
(0.315) 
 
Pt-2
II
 
-0.023 
(0.214) 
 -0.008 
(0.208) 
 -0.003 
(0.297) 
0.028 
(0.319) 
 
Pt-3
II
 
-0.088 
(0.154) 
 -0.127 
(0.149) 
   
 
SIVt-1
II
 
0.050 
(0.117) 
 0.040 
(0.124) 
 0.064 
(0.101) 
0.067 
(0.101) 
 
SIVt-2
II
 -0.022 
(0.078) 
 -0.009 
(0.079) 
 -0.015 
(0.073) 
-0.019 
(0.072) 
 
SIVt-3
II
 -0.022 
(0.078) 
 -0.039 
(0.081) 
   
 
 Turkey  Turkey  Murcia Argentina  
α
I
 4.256 
(2.691) 
 5.186* 
(2.712) 
 12.082*** 
(3.556) 
12.801*** 
(3.599) 
 
Pt-1
I
 
 0.175* 
(0.076) 
  0.171* 
(0.077) 
  0.268*** 
(0.059) 
 0.177*** 
(0.049) 
 
Pt-2
I
 
0.061 
(0.098) 
 0.158 
(0.094) 
 -0.179** 
(0.058) 
-0.090 
(0.048) 
 
Pt-3
I
 -0.154*** 
(0.084) 
 -0.248*** 
(0.075) 
   
 
SIVt-1
I
 
0.464*** 
(0.044) 
 0.451*** 
(0.044) 
 0.387*** 
(0.049) 
0.380*** 
(0.049) 
 
SIVt-2
I
 0.239*** 
(0.040) 
 0.246*** 
(0.040) 
 0.319*** 
(0.034) 
0.316*** 
(0.033) 
 
SIVt-3
I
 0.132*** 
(0.036) 
 0.125*** 
(0.037) 
   
 
α
II
 
7.430 
(6.271) 
 7.296 
(6.374) 
 31.877 
(8.783) 
32.056 
(8.790) 
 
Pt-1
II
 
 -0.004 
(0.407) 
  -0.038 
(0.419) 
  -0.036 
(0.219) 
 -0.023 
(0.226) 
 
Pt-2
II
 
0.757* 
(0.434) 
 0.868* 
(0.442) 
 -0.017 
(0.217) 
-0.028 
(0.223) 
 
Pt-3
II
 -0.795*** 
(0.210) 
 -0.871*** 
(0.213) 
   
 
SIVt-1
II
 
0.408*** 
(0.115) 
 0.440*** 
(0.116) 
 0.116 
(0.119) 
0.125 
(0.119) 
 
SIVt-2
II
 0.337*** 
(0.079) 
 0.336*** 
(0.079) 
 0.357*** 
(0.075) 
0.343*** 
(0.079) 
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SIVt-3II 0.217*** 
(0.067) 
 0.189*** 
(0.066) 
    
 
  
      
Dummies 
    
D101
 
  
-2.836 
(1276.5) 
  -1.005 
(167.7) 
 
D102   -1.481 
(723.4) 
  -4.504 
(245.6) 
 
D103   0.464 
(671.1) 
  -0.431 
(214.7) 
 
D104   -7.762 
(16.994) 
  1.334 
(443.4) 
 
D105   -3.208 
(1075.7) 
  0.081 
(254.4) 
 
D106   3.667 
(668.6) 
  3.432 
(270.7) 
 
D107   0.313 
(68.461) 
  -3.014 
(249.6) 
 
D108   8.647 
(74.397) 
  0.987 
(274.9) 
 
The apexes I and II indicate, respectively, the first and second regime. 
In parenthesis are reported standard errors.  
Significant: *** at 0.001 ; ** at 0.01 ; * at 0.05 
 
 
